Self-Storage Facility Injury Claims in Georgia

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A person hurt at a Georgia self-storage facility has one of two kinds of claim. A fall or other harm from the property itself is decided under the premises statute. An attack by a third person in a lot, a hallway, or at a unit is decided under the negligent security article for causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, and under the Supreme Court’s foreseeability decisions for earlier ones.

The Property Itself

An owner or occupier who invites the public onto the premises owes ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe (OCGA 51-3-1), and an injured invitee must show that the owner knew of the hazard and that the invitee did not, despite ordinary care (Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997)).

A fixed condition the customer could see is treated differently from a hidden one. In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Gillis, No. A24A0537 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2024), a patron who came to the theater every week reached for a handrail that was missing along the middle of a five-step stair and fell. An expert called the missing rail a building code violation, but the Court of Appeals treated it as an open and obvious static condition, observed that negligence per se is not the same thing as liability per se, and reversed the denial of summary judgment. In Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC v. James, 367 Ga. App. 235 (2023), a customer tripped in the dark over unpainted concrete wheel stops; the court held that whether wheel stops placed in an unusual spot and left the same color as the stripe they sat on were a hazard, and whether the customer’s earlier walk near them gave the customer equal knowledge, were questions for the jury.

Attacks by Third Persons

For earlier causes of action, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that foreseeability of a crime is judged from the totality of the circumstances (Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023)), and that “without foreseeability that a criminal act will occur, no duty … arises” (Days Inns of America, Inc. v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235 (1995)).

For causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, the negligent security article is the only remedy for negligent security against owners or occupiers (OCGA 51-3-53(a); SB 68 (2025), Sections 6 and 9(b)). An invitee must prove, among other elements, that the wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable, that the third person exploited a specific physical condition of the premises that the owner or occupier knew about, that the owner did not use ordinary care to remedy or mitigate that condition, and that the failure was a proximate cause of the injury (OCGA 51-3-51).

Frequently Asked Questions

Must an earlier crime at the facility be the same kind of crime?
No. In Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (1997), earlier daytime burglaries of vacant apartments in the complex were enough to put a later rape of an occupant before the jury. Prior crimes must be “substantially similar,” which, in words the Court quoted from an earlier decision, “does not mean identical,” and the question was the foreseeable risk of unauthorized entry and personal injury, not the specific crime.

Does installing cameras or a gate make the facility responsible for every crime?
No. The Supreme Court has said that taking some security measures does not make a property owner an insurer of safety (Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991)).

What if the facility reported a threat to the police?
For claims under the new article, there is no liability based on a particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct if the owner or occupier made any reasonable effort to give that information to law enforcement, and a 9-1-1 call or other report to law enforcement counts as a reasonable effort (OCGA 51-3-54(7)).

Can the storage rental agreement excuse the operator?
In a related setting, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a “no security” provision in a condominium declaration against a tenant as an exculpatory clause, because the lease contained no exculpatory term meeting the requirement, drawn from earlier decisions, that such a clause be explicit, prominent, clear, and unambiguous, and the tenant had not been given the declaration (Tuscany Condominium Association, Inc. v. C.P., No. A25A0145 (Ga. Ct. App. July 2, 2025)).

  • OCGA 51-3-1; Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997)
  • American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Gillis, No. A24A0537 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2024); Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC v. James, 367 Ga. App. 235 (2023)
  • Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023); Days Inns of America, Inc. v. Matt, 265 Ga. 235 (1995); Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (1997); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991)
  • OCGA 51-3-51; OCGA 51-3-53(a); OCGA 51-3-54(7); SB 68 (2025), Sections 6 and 9(b)
  • Tuscany Condominium Association, Inc. v. C.P., No. A25A0145 (Ga. Ct. App. July 2, 2025)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about self-storage facility injury claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether an operator is liable depends on what it knew, what the customer knew, the date the cause of action arose, and the specific facts. A person injured at a storage facility should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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