Bicycle Dooring Accidents in Georgia
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A cyclist riding beside a row of parked cars has a fraction of a second to react when a door swings into the lane, and the choices are to strike the door or veer left into moving traffic. Georgia answers the first legal question, who owed a duty before the door opened, in one sentence of statute, OCGA 40-6-243, and its bicycle rules expressly treat potentially opening car doors as a hazard a cyclist may ride away from.
The Door Statute
OCGA 40-6-243 provides: “No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to do so and can be done without interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a door open on the side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload passengers.” The duty is stated for “any person” who opens a door, so its text is not limited to the driver, and a passenger who opens a door on the traffic side is within the words of the statute. The statute does not define “moving traffic.” The chapter’s vehicle provisions that are not limited to motor vehicles apply to bicycles (OCGA 40-6-291(a)), and Hite v. Anderson, 284 Ga. App. 156 (2007), notes that a bicycle is a vehicle subject to the traffic rules that apply to any other operator of a vehicle.
Negligence Per Se and Its Limits
Hite arose from a collision between a driver turning left and a cyclist, and it explains what a statutory violation does and does not establish. Where a driver “simply pays a fine after pleading not guilty on a citation, pleads nolo contendere, or is adjudicated guilty by a traffic court after pleading not guilty, such payment does not constitute an explicit voluntary admission of guilt which will establish negligence per se.” Even when negligence per se is shown, the court said, “[n]egligence per se is not liability per se” (quoting Humphreys v. Kipfmiller, 237 Ga. App. 572 (1999)). The defendant “bears the burden of showing ‘that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care'” (quoting Roberts v. Ledbetter, 218 Ga. App. 860 (1995)), and “even when negligence per se is shown, the plaintiff must still prove proximate cause and actual damage in order to recover[,] … [a]nd it is generally a jury question as to whether or not such negligence proximately caused the injury” (quoting Duncan v. Randolph, 236 Ga. App. 566 (1999)). Applied to a door opened into a bicycle’s path, those principles leave the plaintiff to prove that the door was opened when it was not reasonably safe to do so, that the opening caused the collision, and that the collision caused the injuries.
The Cyclist’s Position on the Road
OCGA 40-6-294(b) directs a person operating a bicycle upon a roadway to “ride as near to the right side of the roadway as practicable,” except when, among other things, “[a]voiding hazards to safe cycling.” The statute defines that term: “‘hazards to safe cycling’ includes, but shall not be limited to, surface debris, rough pavement, drain grates which are parallel to the side of the roadway, parked or stopped vehicles, potentially opening car doors, or any other objects which threaten the safety of a person operating a bicycle” (OCGA 40-6-294(a)). A cyclist who rides away from the right side must “exercise reasonable care” and “give due consideration to the other applicable rules of the road.”
The cyclist’s duty of care continues regardless of position. In Hite, the court held that a cyclist who may have had the right of way still owed ordinary care in the circumstances, including a duty to keep a lookout, and that whether the cyclist was negligent in failing to observe the turning car was a question for the jury.
Unlike the helmet rule and the child-passenger rules, which state that a violation is not negligence per se, contributory negligence per se, or evidence of negligence or liability (OCGA 40-6-296(d)(5); OCGA 40-6-292(e)), OCGA 40-6-294 contains no such statement.
Shared Fault and a Second Collision
A cyclist who swerves left after a door opens may be struck by a passing vehicle. Fault is measured across everyone who helped cause the injury, whether or not a party; the award is divided among those liable by their percentages, with no joint liability, and a plaintiff 50 percent or more responsible recovers nothing (OCGA 51-12-33(b), (c), (g)).
For example, imagine a cyclist who swerves after a door opens and is struck by a passing car, with a jury finding total damages of $90,000 and assigning 10 percent of the fault to the cyclist, 60 percent to the person who opened the door, and 30 percent to the driver of the car. The judge reduces the award by the cyclist’s 10 percent, to $81,000, and the person who opened the door owes $54,000 and the driver $27,000, each separately.
Frequently Asked Questions
When else may a cyclist leave the right side of the road?
When turning left, avoiding hazards to safe cycling, in a lane too narrow to share safely with a motor vehicle, traveling at the same speed as traffic, exercising due care when passing a standing vehicle or one going the same way, or where there is a right-turn-only lane and the cyclist is not turning right (OCGA 40-6-294(b)).
May cyclists ride side by side past parked cars?
On a roadway, cyclists may not ride more than two abreast, except on bicycle paths, bicycle lanes, roadway areas set aside for bicycles, or under a special event permit (OCGA 40-6-294(c)).
Which direction must a cyclist ride in a bicycle lane?
In the same direction as traffic on the roadway (OCGA 40-6-294(f)).
Can a driver who did not touch anyone share the fault?
In Vaughan v. Glymph, 241 Ga. App. 346 (1999), a truck fishtailed partly into the next lane on an icy road, another driver swerved around it, crossed the median, and struck the plaintiffs’ car head-on, and the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the truck driver because fact questions remained on negligence and proximate cause.
Sources and Legal Authorities
- OCGA 40-6-243; OCGA 40-6-291(a); OCGA 40-6-294(a), (b), (c), (f); OCGA 40-6-296(d)(5); OCGA 40-6-292(e)
- OCGA 51-12-33(b), (c), (g)
- Hite v. Anderson, 284 Ga. App. 156 (2007)
- Humphreys v. Kipfmiller, 237 Ga. App. 572 (1999) (as quoted in Hite v. Anderson)
- Roberts v. Ledbetter, 218 Ga. App. 860 (1995) (as quoted in Hite v. Anderson)
- Duncan v. Randolph, 236 Ga. App. 566 (1999) (as quoted in Hite v. Anderson)
- Vaughan v. Glymph, 241 Ga. App. 346 (1999)
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about bicycle dooring claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Fault depends on how the door was opened, where the cyclist was riding, and what followed. Anyone injured in a dooring crash should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.