Retail Store Injury Claims in Georgia
On this page
A shopper hurt in a Georgia store recovers from the store by proving what each side knew: that the store knew, or through reasonable inspection should have known, of the hazard that caused the injury, and that the shopper did not know of it despite ordinary care (OCGA 51-3-1; Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997)). The evidence that decides these claims is evidence about the hazard: how it got there, how long it was there, when the store last checked, and what the shopper could see.
What a Shopper Has to Prove
A store that invites the public in owes shoppers ordinary care in keeping the store and its approaches safe, but it is not an insurer of their safety (OCGA 51-3-1; Robinson). Robinson sets the two-part showing for a hazard claim: the store’s actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard, and the shopper’s lack of knowledge of it despite ordinary care for personal safety. The shopper’s burden of producing evidence on the second part arises only after the store’s knowledge is established or assumed and the store has produced evidence that the shopper was negligent.
The fall itself proves neither part. The Supreme Court of Georgia said so in Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980): “Falling and injuring one’s self proves nothing.” The same rule decides cases in which the shopper cannot say what caused the fall. In All American Quality Foods, Inc. v. Britten, No. A24A1262 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2025), a shopper fell beside a meat counter without seeing what was underfoot and had only another person’s remark that it was water, and a manager had walked past less than a minute earlier and seen nothing. The Court of Appeals held that nothing but the fall itself tied it to a substance on the floor, and it reversed the denial of summary judgment for the store.
Proving the Store Knew
Actual knowledge means knowledge of the particular hazard. In Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A24A1720 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2025), the store’s general awareness of leaks was not actual knowledge of the water the shopper slipped in.
Constructive knowledge has two routes under Alterman. One rests on a store employee who was close enough to have noticed the hazard. The other rests on time: the hazard had been on the floor long enough that a reasonable inspection would have found it.
Inspection Logs
Where a store documents its floor checks, the last check before a fall becomes a disputed fact. In Drossman, two employees had inspected the area within three and a half minutes before the fall, and the Court of Appeals applied the rule that “when an owner shows that an inspection occurred within a brief period of time prior to an invitee’s fall, the inspection procedure was adequate as a matter of law.” It affirmed for the store.
A longer gap turns the question toward reasonableness. In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009), the Supreme Court placed how closely a particular retailer should monitor its premises among the questions that, in general, must be answered by juries. A log showing a check every thirty minutes establishes the store’s own schedule; whether that schedule was reasonable for the aisle is a separate question.
For example, imagine a store whose written policy calls for an aisle check every thirty minutes. The last documented check was at 2:00 p.m., and a shopper slips at 2:25 p.m. The fall came inside the store’s own interval, so the log does not show when the spill reached the floor, whether an employee passed the spot in between, or whether thirty minutes was reasonable for that aisle. Had the last documented check come three and a half minutes before the fall, the timing would match the interval the Court of Appeals held adequate as a matter of law in Drossman.
When the Store Created the Hazard
The knowledge question changes when the store’s own conduct created the danger. In American Multi-Cinema v. Brown, an employee set an A-frame “Wet Floor” sign over a small spill in the exit path minutes before a crowded showing ended; the sign had fallen over, and a patron leaving in the crowd caught a foot on it. Because the theater put the sign there, the Supreme Court treated it as having actual knowledge of the sign, refused to give warning devices special immunity, and left the remaining questions to the jury.
Doors, Thresholds, and Mats
Some store hazards are part of the building rather than something on the floor, and for those the courts ask what the shopper already knew. In Meadows v. Dollar General Store, 371 Ga. App. 695 (2024), a customer had come through a malfunctioning sliding door earlier the same day, knew that an employee had injured a hand on it, and was hurt pulling it shut under a sign asking customers to do so. The Court of Appeals held that the customer knew of the defect as well as the store did and affirmed summary judgment for the store.
An entrance mat that can move is treated differently. In Johnson v. LT Energy, LLC, No. A23A0240 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2023), the mat inside a store’s entrance was not fastened down, could slide, and lay within view of the employee at the register. Because it could move, the court declined to treat it as a static condition, refused to apply the rule about a customer’s earlier safe passage, and reversed summary judgment: the store knew the mat was unsecured, and whether the mat was a hazard and whether the customer used ordinary care were left to a jury.
The Shopper’s Own Care
Looking away is not by itself a failure of ordinary care. Robinson held that “an invitee’s failure to exercise ordinary care is not established as a matter of law by the invitee’s admission that he did not look at the site on which he placed his foot.” The question is whether the shopper used the prudence an ordinarily careful person would use in the same circumstances. In Robinson itself, the opaque roof of a produce bin blocked the shopper’s view of the spot, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that stepping onto a spot the shopper could not see was a failure of ordinary care as a matter of law.
Distractions inside a store carry their own rule. In Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224 (1994), a customer walking toward the one open register slipped in a puddle of clear liquid while looking at the attendant, who was away from the register, to signal readiness to pay. The Supreme Court held that the testimony was “some evidence that Barentine exercised reasonable care for his own safety in approaching the check-out counter” and reversed the Court of Appeals, which had held that the store was entitled to a directed verdict. Robinson then clarified Barentine: when a shopper was not looking because of something in the store’s control that the store might have anticipated would divert attention, such as the conduct of a store employee, the construction or configuration of the premises, or a merchandise display the shopper would not have anticipated, the shopper has presented some evidence of reasonable care, and the rest is for the factfinder.
Detention at the Exit
OCGA 51-7-60 bars recovery in a false arrest or false imprisonment action when the owner or operator of a retail establishment or food service establishment, or its agent or employee, detained the person under OCGA 17-4-80, and it is established by competent evidence both that the person’s conduct would cause a person of reasonable prudence to believe that, at or immediately before the detention, the person was committing an offense for which OCGA 17-4-80 authorizes detention, and that the manner and length of the detention were reasonable under all the circumstances. The terms retail establishment and food service establishment take their definitions from OCGA 16-7-2 and OCGA 26-2-370.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does it hurt the claim if the shopper noticed the spill just before falling?
Not necessarily. In Morano v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A26A0191 (Ga. Ct. App. June 11, 2026), a shopper stepped without seeing it into hair product that another customer had spilled and that blended in with the tile floor, noticed it, turned to warn another customer, and slipped moments later. The Court of Appeals held that knowledge gained only after the shopper was already exposed to the hazard did not establish an intentional and unreasonable exposure to it as a matter of law, and it reversed summary judgment for the store.
What if the store did not keep video of the fall?
The answer turns on the circumstances. In Holston v. Aboebarensi, Inc., No. A26A1219 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2026), video at an auto repair shop was deleted by mistake, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s refusal to impose sanctions as within its discretion, noting no prejudice and no bad faith. In Hailu v. John Milledge Academy, Inc., No. A25A1130 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2025), the court held that the injured person seeking sanctions did not have to prove that the unsaved video showed the fall, and it sent the question back to the trial court.
Can a shopper who is attacked in the store or its parking lot sue the store?
For causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, that claim is governed by Georgia’s negligent security statute, OCGA 51-3-50 et seq., whose elements include a showing that the attack was reasonably foreseeable and that it came from the attacker exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the store (OCGA 51-3-51; SB 68 (2025), Section 9(b)). Earlier causes of action are governed by prior law.
Can a store employee hurt at work sue the store?
Against the employer, the workers’ compensation remedies replace other rights and remedies for the injury unless the employer has expressly agreed in writing to additional ones, and the employee keeps the right to sue a third party other than a co-employee and the others the statute lists (OCGA 34-9-11(a)).
Sources and Legal Authorities
- OCGA 51-3-1; Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980)
- All American Quality Foods, Inc. v. Britten, No. A24A1262 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2025); Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A24A1720 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2025)
- American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (2009)
- Meadows v. Dollar General Store, 371 Ga. App. 695 (2024); Johnson v. LT Energy, LLC, No. A23A0240 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2023)
- Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224 (1994)
- OCGA 51-7-60 (retail detention; references to OCGA 17-4-80, 16-7-2, and 26-2-370)
- Morano v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A26A0191 (Ga. Ct. App. June 11, 2026); Holston v. Aboebarensi, Inc., No. A26A1219 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2026); Hailu v. John Milledge Academy, Inc., No. A25A1130 (Ga. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2025)
- OCGA 51-3-50 et seq.; OCGA 51-3-51; SB 68 (2025), Section 9(b)
- OCGA 34-9-11(a)
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about Georgia law and is not legal advice. It does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether a particular store injury supports a claim depends on the facts, the store’s knowledge and conduct, and the deadlines that apply. A person dealing with a specific situation should consult a licensed Georgia attorney.