Hunting Accident Claims in Georgia
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The hunter who fired, the maker of a tree stand or harness that failed, and the owner of the land can all be defendants after a Georgia hunting injury, and the law treats each of them differently. The hunter answers under ordinary negligence. The maker answers under the product-liability statute. The landowner is shielded by the Recreational Property Act, which names hunting as a recreational purpose, unless the injury falls within one of its two exceptions: willful or malicious failure to guard or warn, or an injury on a date when the owner charged for the recreational use.
The Hunter Who Fired
A hunter’s conduct is measured by ordinary diligence, the care that ordinarily prudent persons exercise under the same or similar circumstances; its absence is ordinary negligence (OCGA 51-1-2). The Recreational Property Act does not change that. Nothing in it relieves a person using another’s land for recreation “from any obligation which he may have in the absence of this article to exercise care in his use of the land and in his activities thereon or from the legal consequences of failure to employ such care” (OCGA 51-3-26(2)).
The Landowner and the Recreational Property Act
The Act exists to encourage owners to open land and water to the public for recreation by limiting their liability (OCGA 51-3-20). Its main provisions work together:
| Provision | What it does |
|---|---|
| OCGA 51-3-21 | Lists hunting first among recreational purposes, and defines an owner to include the holder of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in control of the premises |
| OCGA 51-3-22 | Removes the owner's duty to keep the premises safe for people entering for recreation, and the duty to warn them of dangers there |
| OCGA 51-3-23 | Provides that permitting recreational use without charge gives no assurance of safety, does not make the entrant an invitee or licensee, and does not make the owner responsible for injuries the entrants cause |
| OCGA 51-3-25 | Keeps liability for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn, and on a date when the owner charges an entrant and someone is injured in connection with the use paid for |
| OCGA 51-3-26 | States that the Act creates no new duty or ground of liability |
The charge exception is tied to a date and to the use paid for, not to land that has ever been paid for. A charge for this purpose is the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to enter or go on the land (OCGA 51-3-21(1)).
Hunting Leases
Because “owner” includes a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, and a person in control of the premises, a hunting club that leases land and lets members or guests hunt is within the Act’s words. Where the Act does not apply, an owner or occupier who invites others onto the premises for a lawful purpose owes ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe (OCGA 51-3-1).
Tree-Stand Falls and Product Liability
A tree stand or harness that fails can support a claim against its manufacturer if the product was not merchantable and reasonably suited to its intended use when the manufacturer sold it, and that condition caused the injury (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(1)). A seller is treated differently: in a strict-liability action, a product seller is not a manufacturer under OCGA 51-1-11 and is not liable as one (OCGA 51-1-11.1(b)). A strict-liability action against the manufacturer must come within ten years after the product was first sold for use or consumption (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(2)).
For example, imagine a tree stand first sold on September 1, 2018, and a fall from it on October 10, 2027. The ten-year repose period for a strict-liability claim ends September 1, 2028, and the two-year period for injury to the person under OCGA 9-3-33 would run to October 10, 2029, so the repose period ends first.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a claim for failure to warn about the stand survive the ten-year limit?
The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the last sentence of OCGA 51-1-11(c) takes failure-to-warn claims outside the statute of repose (Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723 (1994)).
Does an acquittal of the shooter end the civil case?
Not necessarily. A civil claim is decided on a preponderance of the evidence, except as OCGA 51-1-29.5 and OCGA 51-12-5.1 provide, while a criminal guilty verdict needs a higher degree of certainty (OCGA 24-14-3). Cheevers v. Clark, 214 Ga. App. 866 (1994), quoted the rule that an acquittal “does not necessarily show that he was innocent” and is “consistent with the State’s failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
What if the shooter pleaded guilty to a related charge?
The plea is evidence but not conclusive. In a collision case, the Court of Appeals treated a guilty plea as one circumstance for the jury to weigh with the rest of the evidence (Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (1985)).
Does the Act protect an owner who leases land to the State for public hunting?
Yes, unless otherwise agreed in writing, the no-duty and no-assurance provisions apply to an owner of land leased to the state or a subdivision for recreation (OCGA 51-3-24), and lease payments the owner receives for that land do not count as a charge (OCGA 51-3-25(2)).
Sources and Legal Authorities
- OCGA 51-3-1; OCGA 51-3-20 through 51-3-26 (Recreational Property Act)
- OCGA 51-1-2
- OCGA 51-1-11(b), (c); OCGA 51-1-11.1(b); Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723 (1994); OCGA 9-3-33
- OCGA 24-14-3; Cheevers v. Clark, 214 Ga. App. 866 (1994); Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (1985)
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about hunting accident claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Who may be liable, and whether the Recreational Property Act applies, depend on the specific facts, including whether a charge was made for the use. A person injured in a hunting accident should consult a licensed Georgia attorney about the particular situation.