Employer Intentional Torts in Georgia: When Workers’ Compensation Doesn’t Apply

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A worker deliberately harmed by an employer in Georgia meets a workers’ compensation chapter written as the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer, and the text of the exclusivity provision contains no exception for an employer’s intentional act. Whether a tort claim against an employer can proceed therefore depends on the reach of the chapter itself: how it defines a compensable injury, which employers and workers it does not cover, and what an employer has agreed to in writing. The chapter’s own definitions and exclusions, rather than an intentional-act exception, mark where a tort claim can begin.

What the Exclusivity Provision Says

OCGA 34-9-11(a) provides that “[t]he rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude and be in place of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his or her personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, and all other civil liabilities whatsoever at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death.” Two provisos follow. First, “the employer may be liable to the employee for rights and remedies beyond those provided in this chapter by expressly agreeing in writing to specific additional rights and remedies.” Second, “the use of contractual provisions generally relating to workplace safety, generally relating to compliance with laws or regulations, or generally relating to liability insurance requirements shall not be construed to create rights and remedies beyond those provided in this chapter.”

The Definition of a Compensable Injury

The exclusivity provision applies “on account of such injury,” and the chapter defines the term. Under OCGA 34-9-1(4), “injury” or “personal injury” “means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” The same definition provides that the terms “shall not include injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee.” That exclusion appears in the definition in OCGA 34-9-1(4), not in OCGA 34-9-11(a).

Employers and Workers the Chapter Does Not Cover

OCGA 34-9-1(2) defines “employee” as “every person in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except a person whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of the employer.” OCGA 34-9-2(a)(2) lists further exclusions. The chapter does not apply:

  • to employees whose work is outside the usual course of the employer’s trade, business, occupation, or profession and not incidental to it;
  • to farm laborers and domestic servants, or to their employers;
  • to a person, firm, or private corporation that regularly employs fewer than three employees in the same business in Georgia, unless the employer and those employees choose to be bound; or
  • to certain common carriers by railroad and their employees, as OCGA 34-9-2(a)(2) and (b) provide.

Whether a given workplace falls inside or outside the chapter is a question about these definitions, and it comes before any question about intentional conduct.

Third Parties and Co-Employees

The exclusivity provision preserves claims against others: “No employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tort-feasor, other than an employee of the same employer or any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee.” It also excepts a construction design professional retained on the project, unless that professional takes on the project’s safety practices by written contract, and the design professional’s immunity does not extend to, among other things, intentional misconduct by the design professional or its employees (OCGA 34-9-11(a)). That is the only reference to intentional misconduct in the subsection, and it concerns a construction design professional, not an employer. Subsection (c) extends the employer’s immunity to businesses using a temporary help contracting firm or an employee leasing company when the required benefits are provided.

Two Clocks

A compensation claim has its own deadline: it is barred unless filed within a year of the injury, though where the employer has paid weekly benefits or furnished remedial treatment, the claim may be filed within one year after the last remedial treatment or two years after the last weekly payment (OCGA 34-9-82(a)). A claim for death benefits must be filed within a year of the employee’s death (OCGA 34-9-82(b)). The period for an action for injuries to the person is two years after the right of action accrues (OCGA 9-3-33).

For example, imagine a worker injured on March 1, 2026, who receives no benefits or treatment from the employer. A compensation claim would be barred unless filed by March 1, 2027, while the two-year period for a tort action would run to March 1, 2028.

Punitive Damages If a Tort Claim Proceeds

Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof, and outside product liability there is no limit on punitive damages against an active tort-feasor found to have acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to cause harm (OCGA 51-12-5.1(b), (f)).

Frequently Asked Questions

Is a heart attack at work an “injury” under the chapter?
Only if a preponderance of competent and credible evidence, including medical evidence, shows it was attributable to the performance of the usual work of the employment; the same rule applies to heart disease, coronary occlusion, stroke, and thrombosis (OCGA 34-9-1(4)).

Does the chapter cover the aggravation of a preexisting condition?
Yes, when the aggravation results from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, but only for as long as the aggravation continues to be the cause of the disability (OCGA 34-9-1(4)).

Are real estate salespeople inside the chapter?
Not a licensed real estate salesperson or associate broker whose written contract of employment provides that all services will be performed as an independent contractor (OCGA 34-9-2(a)(2)).

Does the farm laborer exclusion reach workers who care for wildlife?
Yes. The term “farm laborer” includes a person employed in connection with raising, feeding, and caring for wildlife (OCGA 34-9-2(a)(1)).

  • OCGA 34-9-11(a), (c)
  • OCGA 34-9-1(2), (4); OCGA 34-9-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)
  • OCGA 34-9-82(a), (b)
  • OCGA 9-3-33
  • OCGA 51-12-5.1(b), (f)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about workers’ compensation exclusivity under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether the chapter covers a particular worker or workplace, and whether any claim survives outside it, depend on the specific facts and on deadlines that can pass quickly. An injured worker should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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