Soft Tissue Injuries in Georgia: Proving Invisible Damage
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A neck or back injury that never shows on an X-ray or MRI can still reach a Georgia jury. In Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga. App. 74 (1989), the plaintiff’s case was the plaintiff’s own testimony, a responding officer’s testimony, photographs of the damaged car, and $2,245 in chiropractic bills, and the Court of Appeals held that the case should not have been taken from the jury for lack of a medical expert. A claim like that then depends on whether the jury needs an expert to connect the symptoms to the collision, how the claimant’s complaints to providers come into evidence, and how the medical bills are valued.
When Causation Needs an Expert
The rule comes from Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (2010). Expert evidence is required only where a lay jury would need answers to medical questions that, as the case law defines them, only witnesses with specialized expert knowledge can answer accurately. The Supreme Court of Georgia added that such evidence “is not required in the mine run of simple negligence cases, but it is required in some negligence cases,” and it cited Jordan as an example on the side of no expert: whether a collision caused a backache later the same day.
What separates the two sides is whether jurors can draw the link from ordinary experience. In Jordan, the plaintiff testified to pain later the same day, continuing pain from the back of the head through the neck and shoulders, chiropractic treatment that gave relief, and an end to treatment four months after the collision. The Court of Appeals held that “where, as here, there is no significant lapse of time between the injury sustained and the onset of the physical condition for which the injured party seeks compensation, and the injury sustained is a matter which jurors must be credited with knowing by reason of common knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required in order for a plaintiff to establish a personal injury case sufficient to withstand a defendant’s motion for directed verdict.” It set the limit in the same opinion: “A causal connection, requiring expert medical testimony, must be established where the ‘potential continuance of a disease’ is at issue.” It distinguished Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516 (1987), where at least three years separated a college football injury from the condition for which compensation was sought.
When an expert is needed, OCGA 24-7-702(b) sets the gate for that witness and for any expert the defense calls: the testimony must rest on enough facts or data, come from reliable principles and methods, and apply those methods reliably to the facts of the case, and the expert’s specialized knowledge must help the trier of fact.
How the Claimant’s Complaints Reach the Jury
Proof of an injury that does not image can come from what the claimant told providers and what the providers wrote down. Statements “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment” are not excluded by the hearsay rule (OCGA 24-8-803(4)). A provider’s records can also qualify as business records if made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge and a business duty to report, kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and made as a regular practice of that activity, unless the source or circumstances “indicate lack of trustworthiness” (OCGA 24-8-803(6)). These exceptions answer a hearsay objection; the weight of a record of consistent complaints is for the jury.
Medical Bills Under OCGA 51-12-1.1
For causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, special damages for medical and healthcare expenses are limited to the reasonable value of medically necessary care, treatment, or services, and the trier of fact determines the amount (OCGA 51-12-1.1(b)). If the plaintiff has any public or private health insurance, the evidence of reasonable value includes both the amounts charged and the amounts needed to satisfy those charges under the insurance contract, whether or not the insurance has been, is, or will be used (OCGA 51-12-1.1(c)).
For example, imagine a course of chiropractic care and physical therapy billed at $18,000, where $9,500 would satisfy the charges under the claimant’s health insurance contract. Under subsection (c), both figures are evidence of reasonable value, and under subsection (b) the trier of fact decides the amount; the statute does not fix it at either figure.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do earlier backaches end a soft-tissue claim?
In Jordan, the plaintiff had “suffered from some backaches prior to the collision but had not been under medical care,” and the Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict for the defense without treating the earlier backaches as a bar.
Can a chiropractor’s records come in without the chiropractor testifying?
The business records exception can be shown “by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or by certification that complies with paragraph (11) or (12) of Code Section 24-9-902 or by any other statute permitting certification” (OCGA 24-8-803(6)).
Can the lawyer name a dollar figure for pain and suffering?
Only at set times. Counsel may argue the worth of noneconomic damages only after the close of evidence, at the party’s first opportunity to argue damages; the argument must be rationally related to the evidence, and counsel with the opening and concluding arguments may not argue a figure in closing unless one was argued in opening, and may not change it (OCGA 9-10-184(b), (c)). SB 68 (2025) applies this rule to cases pending on its effective date unless that application would be unconstitutional (SB 68, Section 9(b)).
What has to be disclosed when treatment was given under a letter of protection?
For treatment given in exchange for a promise of payment out of a judgment or settlement, the letter, itemized and coded charges, the name of any third party that bought the accounts receivable below the invoice price and what it paid, and whether and by whom the claimant was referred are all relevant and discoverable (OCGA 51-12-1.1(d)).
Can the defense argue that the therapy was not needed?
Yes. Nothing in the statute limits either side’s right to present evidence challenging whether medical expenses, incurred or projected, are reasonable, or whether a treatment was medically necessary (OCGA 51-12-1.1(f)).
Sources and Legal Authorities
- Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (2010); Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga. App. 74 (1989); Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516 (1987), as described in Jordan
- OCGA 24-7-702(b); OCGA 24-8-803(4), (6)
- OCGA 51-12-1.1(b), (c), (d), (f)
- OCGA 9-10-184(b), (c); SB 68 (2025), Section 9(b)
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about soft-tissue injury claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. What must be proved, and how, depends on the specific facts, the timing of symptoms, and the medical evidence. A person with a soft-tissue injury should consult a licensed Georgia attorney about the particular situation.