Railroad Crossing Accidents in Georgia

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A collision at a railroad crossing raises a threshold question that an ordinary vehicle claim does not: whether federal law has already decided the part of the claim that concerns warning devices or train speed. The United States Supreme Court answered that question for a Georgia crossing in 1993 and for a Tennessee crossing in 2000, and the answer depends on facts such as whether federal funds paid for the devices at the crossing. Georgia law adds its own duties for drivers and for crossing signs.

The Federal Statute

Under 49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(1), “[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety … shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.” A State “may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation … prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement,” and may adopt an additional or more stringent law when it is “necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard,” “is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government,” and “does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce” (49 U.S.C. 20106(a)(2)).

Subsection (b)(1) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party” failed to comply with the federal standard of care established by a regulation or order, failed to comply “with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or order,” or failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with subsection (a)(2). That clarification applies to State law causes of action “arising from events or activities occurring on or after January 18, 2002” (49 U.S.C. 20106(b)(2)). Subsection (c) adds that the section “creates” no federal cause of action and does not “confer[] Federal question jurisdiction for such State law causes of action.”

What the Supreme Court Decided

The rule comes from two decisions. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), the Court wrote that 23 CFR 646.214(b)(3) and (4) “establish requirements as to the installation of particular warning devices,” and that “when they are applicable, state tort law is pre-empted.” In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000), it gave the reason: once the federal highway agency “has funded the crossing improvement and the warning devices are actually installed and operating, the regulation ‘displace[s] state and private decisionmaking authority by establishing a federal-law requirement that certain protective devices be installed or federal approval obtained.'”

The two cases mark the line on their facts. Easterwood arose from a collision at the Cook Street crossing in Cartersville, Georgia, in which a truck driver was killed. The driver’s surviving spouse alleged that the railroad was negligent under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices and for operating the train at an excessive speed. Cartersville had dropped its plans for a gate at Cook Street, and the funds earmarked for that crossing were transferred to other projects, so the regulations did not apply and the warning-device claim was not pre-empted. The speed claim came out the other way. The track at Cook Street was class four, with a federal maximum of 60 miles per hour, the train was traveling at less than that, and the Court held that the federal limits in 49 CFR 213.9(a) “must be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding additional state regulation of the sort which respondent seeks to impose on petitioner.”

In Shanklin, a driver was killed at a Tennessee crossing that had advance warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks installed by the state transportation department with federal funds. The Court held that the regulations “establish a standard of adequacy that ‘determine[s] the devices to be installed’ when federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project,” so the claim that the devices were inadequate was pre-empted.

The Federal Regulation

For a project “where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices,” adequate warning devices “are to include automatic gates with flashing light signals when one or more of the following conditions exist,” with the conditions listed in 23 CFR 646.214(b)(3)(i). For crossings where paragraph (b)(3) is not applicable, “the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of FHWA” (23 CFR 646.214(b)(4)). Whether federal funds participated in the devices at a particular crossing is a question of fact for that crossing.

The Driver’s Duties Under Georgia Law

OCGA 40-6-140(b) provides that a driver approaching a railroad grade crossing “shall stop within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of such railroad and shall not proceed until he or she can do so safely” when a clearly visible signal warns of an approaching train, a crossing gate is lowered or a flagman signals, or an approaching train or other on-track equipment “is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing.” Where no signal, gate, stop sign, or flagman is present, “all drivers shall slow to a reasonable and prudent speed and verify that there is no approaching train or other on-track equipment prior to proceeding,” meaning “a speed slow enough to enable the driver to safely stop the vehicle prior to reaching the nearest rail of such crossing” (OCGA 40-6-140(d)).

The department “shall place and maintain a sign for each railroad crossing at grade on the state highway system,” and “each railroad company shall also erect and maintain a railroad crossbuck sign on its right of way at every such crossing”; counties and municipalities do the same on their own road systems (OCGA 32-6-50(b), (c)(1)).

Frequently Asked Questions

Is a claim that the crew failed to slow for a vehicle on the tracks pre-empted too?
Easterwood did not decide it. The railroad conceded that pre-emption of the excessive-speed claim “does not bar suit for breach of related tort law duties, such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard,” and the Court said the case “does not present, and we do not address,” the pre-emptive effect on such related claims.

Can a crossing with federally funded devices be upgraded?
Yes. In Shanklin, the Court noted that “nothing prevents a State from revisiting the adequacy of devices installed using federal funds,” and that States “are free to install more protective devices at such crossings with their own funds or with additional funding from the FHWA.” What a State cannot do after installing federally funded devices is hold the railroad responsible for their adequacy.

Does it matter that traffic or conditions at the crossing changed after installation?
Not for pre-emption. “Whether the State should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that automatic gates and flashing lights would be appropriate, is immaterial to the pre-emption question” (Shanklin).

May a driver go around a lowered gate?
No. “No person shall drive any vehicle through, around, or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing while such gate or barrier is closed or is being opened or closed” (OCGA 40-6-140(c)).

When is it unlawful to drive onto a crossing even without a signal?
When a train or other on-track equipment is approaching, when there is not enough space to drive completely through the crossing without stopping, or when the vehicle lacks the undercarriage clearance to negotiate the crossing (OCGA 40-6-140(e), (f), (g)).

  • 49 U.S.C. 20106(a), (b), (c)
  • CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000)
  • 23 CFR 646.214(b)(3), (b)(4); 49 CFR 213.9(a) (as described in Easterwood)
  • OCGA 40-6-140(b)-(g); OCGA 32-6-50(b), (c)(1)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about railroad crossing collisions under Georgia and federal law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether federal law affects a claim depends on the funding and history of the particular crossing and the specific facts. A person injured at a railroad crossing should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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