Inadequate Lighting and Parking Lot Crimes in Georgia

Whether a poorly lit parking lot supports a claim after a robbery or assault depends first on the date of the crime. Georgia enacted a negligent security statute in 2025 that governs causes of action arising on or after the Act’s effective date, and earlier crimes are governed by prior law, which is the general premises duty in OCGA 51-3-1 as applied in the decisions. Under prior law, the decisions treated lighting as part of the security measures a jury weighs; under the 2025 statute, the claim turns on a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner.

The Date That Decides Which Law Applies

Under Section 9(b) of Senate Bill 68, Sections 6 and 7 reach only causes of action arising on or after the Act’s effective date, and earlier causes of action remain under prior law. Section 6 is the negligent security article, OCGA 51-3-50 through 51-3-57. The Act became effective on approval by the Governor (Section 9(a)), and the Court of Appeals stated in Barker v. Grier, No. A26A0229 (Ga. Ct. App. June 22, 2026), that the Act’s amendments to OCGA 9-10-184 became effective on April 21, 2025. A crime committed before that date is a cause of action arising before it.

Before the Statute: Two Parking Lot Decisions

For an earlier crime, the duty comes from OCGA 51-3-1, under which an owner or occupier who invites others onto the premises owes ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991), involved a robbery in a restaurant parking lot on December 23, 1987, four days after a purse snatching in the same lot. The proprietor’s affidavit stated that the restaurant operated four floodlights directed at the lot and two on its sign, that streetlights and neighboring businesses lit the lot indirectly, and that the proprietor had patrolled the lot several times each evening after the earlier incident. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the evidence of duty, though “weak,” was sufficient for a jury because the proprietor knew of the prior purse snatching and might have known the area was a high crime area. On breach, it held for the restaurant: the only evidence about security showed a well-lit lot, and the plaintiffs “have not presented any evidence that the condition of the parking lot fell below reasonable security standards, e.g., that the lights were not working, or that deep shadows provided places for criminals to lurk, or that other local proprietors had found it necessary to hire security guards, etc.” The Court also wrote that “[a] landowner does not become an insurer of safety by taking some security precautions on behalf of invitees,” and it declined “to require owners to post signs warning of a generalized risk of crime.”

In Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023), the Supreme Court addressed a shooting during an armed robbery in a CVS parking lot. Employees testified that the store was in a high-crime area, that they considered the lot unsafe, and that employees parked near the building because of the poor lighting in the lot. CVS had discharged its security guard, and three crimes followed: two armed robberies of employees inside the store, one fewer than 30 days before the shooting and the other about two years before it, and one robbery of a customer in the lot about six months before it. The Court held that the reasonable foreseeability of a third-party criminal act is linked to the proprietor’s duty under OCGA 51-3-1, that “the totality of the circumstances informs whether a third-party criminal act was reasonably foreseeable,” and that the question is for the jury unless no rational juror could find for the non-moving party. It rejected a reading of Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (1997), and Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480 (2019), as requiring a substantially similar prior crime in every case, wrote that evidence of such crimes “is not a required consideration, and other circumstances may be relevant, too,” and stated that it neither disapproved nor overruled Sturbridge. Prior crimes “need not be identical to the crime in question.” A business’s location in a high-crime area does not, on its own, establish a duty to keep the premises safe from every conceivable crime.

The jury in Carmichael assigned 95 percent of the fault to CVS, 5 percent to the plaintiff, and none to the shooter. The Court held that the verdict was not inconsistent because, “when considered in conjunction with the instructions to the jury, the verdict is capable of a viable construction.” It also held that “a party rendering security services to a proprietor may owe a duty of care to third parties visiting the premises in accordance with the standard outlined in Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” In Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359 (2012), the Court had answered a certified question by holding that a jury may apportion damages between a property owner and a criminal assailant.

The 2025 Statute: Who Is Covered and What Must Be Proved

“Negligent security” means a claim against an owner or occupier, or a security contractor, that sounds in tort or nuisance, seeks damages for bodily injury or wrongful death, and “[a]rises from an alleged failure to keep the premises and approaches safe from the wrongful conduct of third persons” (OCGA 51-3-50(1)). “Wrongful conduct” is a violation of state law or a local ordinance punishable as a felony or misdemeanor, “regardless of whether such violation results in an arrest, citation, accusation, indictment, or conviction,” or other conduct amounting to an intentional, or willful and wanton, tort (OCGA 51-3-50(8)). The article’s other defined terms include “particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person,” meaning information actually known to and deemed credible by the owner or occupier and specific as to the identity of the third person, the nature and character, degree of dangerousness, location, time, and circumstances of the conduct (OCGA 51-3-50(3)), and “prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct,” meaning occurrences sufficiently similar in nature and character, degree of dangerousness, proximity, location, time, and circumstances that a reasonable person in the owner’s position would apprehend that such conduct “is reasonably likely to occur upon the premises” and would understand that a specific and known physical condition of the premises has created a risk of it substantially greater than the general risk in the vicinity (OCGA 51-3-50(5)).

For an injured invitee, an owner or occupier is liable if the plaintiff proves five things (OCGA 51-3-51). First, the third person’s wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable because the owner or occupier either “[h]ad particularized warning of imminent wrongful conduct by a third person” or “[r]easonably should have known that a third person was reasonably likely to engage in such wrongful conduct upon the premises,” based on prior occurrences of substantially similar wrongful conduct that the owner or occupier had actual knowledge of and that took place on the premises, on adjoining property or within 500 yards of the premises, or were committed by the same third person under the conditions in subparagraph (B)(iii). Second, the injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct. Third, the conduct “was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such third person exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner or occupier, which created a reasonably foreseeable risk of wrongful conduct on the premises that was substantially greater than the general risk of wrongful conduct in the vicinity of the premises.” Fourth, the owner or occupier “failed to exercise ordinary care to remedy or mitigate such specific and known physical condition of the premises and to otherwise keep the premises safe from such wrongful conduct.” Fifth, that failure was a proximate cause of the injury.

For a licensee, the standard is higher: the owner or occupier must have had a particularized warning, and must have “willfully and wantonly failed to exercise any care to remedy or mitigate the specific and known physical condition of the premises” (OCGA 51-3-52). The article is “the sole and exclusive remedy for negligent security against owners or occupiers,” with exceptions for a cause of action brought under OCGA 51-1-56 or another recognized theory of recovery “in connection with an alleged violation of Code Section 16-5-46,” and for claims for breach of contract or other claims “not arising under Article 1 of this chapter” (OCGA 51-3-53).

Exceptions and the Standard of Care

No owner or occupier is liable for negligent security arising from an injury to a trespasser, an injury to a person not on the premises, wrongful conduct not occurring on the premises and in a place from which the owner had the legal right and authority to exclude the third person, or wrongful conduct by a tenant or a tenant’s guest when the owner had commenced eviction proceedings against the tenant (OCGA 51-3-54(1) through (4)).

No owner or occupier is required “to exercise extraordinary care” to keep persons safe from a third person’s wrongful conduct, or “to assume the responsibilities and obligations of government for law enforcement and public safety” (OCGA 51-3-55(a)). In assessing breach, the trier of fact considers the security measures in place at the time of the injury, the need for additional or other measures, their practicality, whether they would have prevented the injury, the respective responsibilities of owners and government, and any other relevant circumstances (OCGA 51-3-55(b)). A security contractor that assumes a duty to invitees and licensees “may be liable for negligent security only in the same manner, to the same extent, and subject to the same limitations and provisions applicable to an owner or occupier,” and never to a greater extent (OCGA 51-3-57(a)).

Apportionment Under the Statute

In an action for negligent security, if the trier of fact finds any defendant liable, it “shall make an apportionment of fault under Code Section 51-12-33” and shall reasonably apportion fault to the owner or occupier, to any third person whose wrongful conduct was a cause of the injury, and to any other person to whom fault should be apportioned under that Code section (OCGA 51-3-56(1)). If a jury “fails as the trier of fact to apportion a reasonable degree of fault to the third person whose wrongful conduct was a cause of the injury,” the court “shall set aside the verdict of the jury and order a retrial of liability and damages,” and “[t]here shall be a rebuttable presumption that an apportionment of fault is unreasonable if the total percentage of fault apportioned to all third persons for their wrongful conduct is less than the total percentage of fault apportioned to all owners or occupiers, security contractors, and other persons and entities that did not engage in wrongful conduct” (OCGA 51-3-56(3)).

For example, imagine a jury that, assigning no fault to the plaintiff, assigns 30 percent of the fault to a shopping center owner, 10 percent to its security contractor, and 60 percent to the assailant. The third persons carry 60 percent and the owner and contractor together carry 40 percent, so the presumption does not arise. If the jury instead assigns 40 percent to the owner, 20 percent to the contractor, and 40 percent to the assailant, the third persons’ 40 percent is less than the other parties’ combined 60 percent, and the rebuttable presumption arises.

Where Lighting Fits

The negligent security article does not use the word lighting. Under OCGA 51-3-51, the claim turns on a “specific physical condition of the premises known to the owner or occupier,” on the owner’s failure to remedy or mitigate that condition, and on whether the crime was foreseeable. For crimes before the Act, the decisions treated lighting as part of the security measures a jury weighs: Lau’s held that a well-lit lot with floodlights and patrols defeated the breach claim absent evidence that “the lights were not working” or that “deep shadows provided places for criminals to lurk,” and in Carmichael the employees’ testimony about the poor lighting in the lot was part of the evidence the jury heard.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the deadline to sue pause while the criminal case is pending?
It can. The limitation period for a tort action by the victim of an alleged crime, arising out of that crime, is tolled from the date of the crime until the prosecution becomes final or otherwise ends, for no more than six years, except as OCGA 9-3-33.1 provides (OCGA 9-3-99).

Does calling 911 protect the owner?
Where a particularized warning was involved, the owner is not liable if it made any reasonable effort to give the information to law enforcement, and “calling 9-1-1 or otherwise making a report about such information to law enforcement personnel shall be deemed a reasonable effort” (OCGA 51-3-54(7)).

Can the jury hear about the attacker’s sentence or the owner’s wealth?
No. Under the 2025 statute, no party may offer evidence or argue before the jury about any punishment that could be imposed on the third person, the financial resources of any party or nonparty, or the effect of an apportionment on the plaintiff’s award (OCGA 51-3-56(2)).

Are there people the statute does not protect at all?
Yes. The owner is not liable to an invitee or licensee who came onto the premises to commit a felony or a misdemeanor under Chapter 8 of Title 16, or who was committing one when injured, though that second branch does not apply to a victim of a violation of OCGA 16-5-46, and the article does not reach an injury on premises used as a single-family residence (OCGA 51-3-54(5), (6)).

Sources and Legal Authorities

• Senate Bill 68 (2025), Section 6 and Section 9
• OCGA 51-3-1; OCGA 51-3-50; OCGA 51-3-51; OCGA 51-3-52; OCGA 51-3-53; OCGA 51-3-54; OCGA 51-3-55; OCGA 51-3-56; OCGA 51-3-57
• Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991)
• Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023); Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (1997) and Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 305 Ga. 480 (2019) (both as discussed in Carmichael)
• Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359 (2012)
• Barker v. Grier, No. A26A0229 (Ga. Ct. App. June 22, 2026)
• OCGA 9-3-99; OCGA 51-12-33

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about premises liability and negligent security under Georgia law. It is not legal advice, is not medical advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether an owner or occupier is liable depends on the date of the crime, what the owner knew, and the specific facts. A person injured in a crime should seek medical care and consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.