Calculating Pain and Suffering Damages in Georgia

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Georgia law supplies no formula for pain and suffering. The amount is left to the enlightened conscience of the jury, the Court of Appeals has rejected a multiple of medical expenses and lost wages as the measure, and since April 21, 2025 a rewritten statute controls when and how a lawyer may suggest a figure to the jury. The same statute counts loss of enjoyment of life among noneconomic damages, and a pain-and-suffering charge the Court of Appeals approved in 2024 lists interference with the enjoyment of life among the factors a jury may weigh.

No Rule or Yardstick

Georgia sets no formula for pain and suffering: the jury measures it by its enlightened conscience, not as a multiple of the medical bills and lost wages. In AT Systems Southeast, Inc. v. Carnes, 272 Ga. App. 671 (2005), a passenger in a minivan struck by an armored truck suffered a displaced posterior and anterior column fracture, a type of hip fracture, was immobile for about six months, and developed blood clots in the legs and a pulmonary embolus. The jury returned a verdict of $1,250,000. The defendant argued that, given special damages of “only $74,791.16,” the award was flagrantly excessive; the award was more than 16 times that figure. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Quoting Smith v. Crump, 223 Ga. App. 52 (1996), it wrote that “pain and suffering in the past, present, and future are measured by the enlightened conscience of a fair and impartial jury” and that “[t]here exists no rule or yardstick against which damages for pain and suffering are to be measured, as suggested by [AT Systems], who would have such damages as some multiple of special damages for medical expenses and lost wages.” The reason, in the quoted passage, was that an objective yardstick would treat “the young, the old, the sick, the disabled, the rich, the poor, the unemployed, and the underemployed” differently than “the fully employed.”

The same court had used the same standard three years earlier. In McCormick v. Harris, 253 Ga. App. 417 (2002), the jury awarded $1,500 to a driver whose stopped car was struck from the rear on a state highway, and the court wrote that the amount of a pain-and-suffering verdict “is governed by no other standard than the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors,” quoting Palmer v. Farmer, 184 Ga. App. 753 (1987). The plaintiff had presented medical bills of $3,939.86 and evidence that future knee surgery would cost $7,500, but the doctors testified that the knee condition could have developed without any injury, so causation was a jury question. The court noted that the jury may have awarded the $729.40 emergency room bill plus an additional amount for pain and suffering, and it affirmed the denial of a new trial.

In Barker v. Grier, No. A26A0229 (Ga. Ct. App. June 22, 2026), the plaintiff’s knee, back, neck, and thumb were injured in a collision; the plaintiff had undergone 19 injections and was still dealing with pain at the time of trial. The jury awarded $450,000. The defendant argued that the evidence could not support the figure because the plaintiff called no expert or medical provider and introduced no medical bills. The Court of Appeals found no error, relying on Carnes for the rule that no yardstick exists against which damages for pain and suffering are measured.

Loss of Enjoyment of Life

The loss sometimes called hedonic damages appears in Georgia law inside noneconomic damages. OCGA 9-10-184(a)(2) lists loss of enjoyment of life among noneconomic damages, together with physical or emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish, physical impairment, and disfigurement, and, in wrongful death cases, the nonpecuniary elements of the full value of life.

It can also be weighed within pain and suffering. In Geary v. Estate of Tapley, No. A24A0978 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2024), a medical malpractice case in which the estate sought damages for the decedent’s pain and suffering, the Court of Appeals said the trial court “gave a correct charge on pain and suffering damages.” That charge told the jury it could consider, if proven, “[i]nterference with normal living,” “[i]nterference with the enjoyment of life,” “[l]oss in capacity to work and labor, separate from earnings,” “[i]mpairment of bodily health and vigor,” and “the extent to which Plaintiff must limit activities,” among other factors, and the court’s footnote pointed to Georgia’s suggested pattern charge on the subject (Civil 66.501).

The evidence in Carnes shows what such proof can look like. The passenger was 59 at the time of the collision and, as a homemaker, had been active in church and with grandchildren; after the injury, the passenger could no longer babysit the grandchildren or take part in former church activities. That testimony was part of the record on which the $1,250,000 verdict was affirmed.

What Counsel May Say About Value

Until the 2025 amendments, OCGA 9-10-184 provided, in the text quoted in Barker, that “counsel shall be allowed to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided, however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deductions from the evidence in the case.” The current statute is longer. Except as subsection (c) allows, counsel “shall not argue the worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages” and shall not, in the hearing of the jury or any prospective juror, “elicit any testimony regarding, or make any reference to, any specific amount or range of amounts of noneconomic damages,” the measure of such damages being “the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury” (OCGA 9-10-184(b)).

Subsection (c)(1) permits the argument “only after the close of evidence and at the time of such party’s first opportunity to argue the issue of damages,” and the argument “shall be rationally related to the evidence of noneconomic damages and shall not make reference to objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence.” Subsection (c)(2) adds a limit for counsel who is entitled to the opening and concluding arguments: counsel may not argue a value in the concluding argument unless counsel argued a value in the opening argument, and “shall not argue a different worth or monetary value of noneconomic damages in concluding arguments than was argued in such counsel’s opening argument.”

For example, imagine a plaintiff’s counsel, holding both the opening and the concluding argument after the close of evidence, who asks the jury for $150 for each of 1,000 days, or $150,000. Under subsection (c)(2), a concluding argument for $200 a day, or $200,000, would be a different value, and a concluding argument that named a figure when the opening argument had named none would be barred as well.

Trials Held Before the Amendments

Barker shows how the change played out for one earlier trial. The amendments became effective on April 21, 2025, after the trial and while post-trial motions were pending. The defendant argued that plaintiff’s counsel, for the first time in rebuttal closing argument, had asked the jury to “give Ms. Grier 500 dollars for every single day that the defense has denied taking responsibility,” and that the figure violated the amended statute. The Court of Appeals recognized that the 2025 amendments “apply to causes of action pending on the effective date,” but held that the General Assembly had not said whether they reach a trial that had already concluded, and it wrote that “the 2025 amendments do not apply with respect to the trial.” It left open “whether the relevant activity is the entire trial or just closing arguments.” The defendant separately argued that the award was improperly punitive because of statements in closing argument; because the defendant made no objection to those statements at trial, the Court of Appeals held that argument waived.

Review of the Amount

A verdict for pain and suffering is reviewed under OCGA 51-12-12(a): “the court should not interfere with the jury’s verdict unless the damages awarded by the jury are clearly so inadequate or so excessive as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence in the case.” Carnes describes the defendant’s burden as “heavy” and says appellate courts “should be hesitant to second-guess verdicts where the damage award is based in any significant part on pain and suffering,” quoting Beam v. Kingsley, 255 Ga. App. 715 (2002).

Frequently Asked Questions

Can a person recover for mental suffering without physical suffering?
The charge approved in Geary told the jury that pain and suffering “includes mental suffering, but mental suffering is not a legal item of damage unless there is” physical suffering as well.

What happens if a lawyer mentions a forbidden figure?
The court “shall take remedial measures as provided in Code Section 9-10-185 or shall, with respect to prospective jurors, excuse the prospective jurors” (OCGA 9-10-184(d)). Section 9-10-185 makes it “the duty of the court to interpose and prevent” prejudicial statements of matters not in evidence, requires the court on objection to rebuke counsel and instruct the jury, and gives the court discretion to order a mistrial when the statements came from the plaintiff’s attorney.

What may be asked about damages during jury selection?
Prospective jurors may be asked whether they could return a verdict that awards no damages or one “in excess of some unspecified amount,” if the question is supported by the evidence (OCGA 9-10-184(e)).

Can a judge order a new trial on damages alone?
Yes. If the award is clearly inadequate or excessive, the trial court may order a new trial as to damages only, or may condition a new trial on a party’s refusal to accept an amount the court determines, and “[o]nly one grant of a new trial by the judge may be based upon the powers conferred by this Code section” (OCGA 51-12-12(b), (c)).

  • OCGA 9-10-184(a)(2), (b), (c), (d), (e); OCGA 9-10-185
  • OCGA 51-12-12(a), (b), (c)
  • AT Systems Southeast, Inc. v. Carnes, 272 Ga. App. 671 (2005); Smith v. Crump, 223 Ga. App. 52 (1996) and Beam v. Kingsley, 255 Ga. App. 715 (2002) (both as quoted in Carnes)
  • McCormick v. Harris, 253 Ga. App. 417 (2002); Palmer v. Farmer, 184 Ga. App. 753 (1987) (as quoted in McCormick)
  • Geary v. Estate of Tapley, No. A24A0978 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2024)
  • Barker v. Grier, No. A26A0229 (Ga. Ct. App. June 22, 2026)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about pain and suffering damages under Georgia law. It is not legal advice, is not medical advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. The value of a claim depends on the evidence and the specific facts. A person injured in an accident should seek medical care and consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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