Defective Airbag Injuries in Georgia: Takata Recalls and Product Liability Claims
On this page
- The Takata Inflator Defect
- What a Claimant Must Show Under OCGA 51-1-11
- Manufacturing, Design, and Warning Claims
- The Ten-Year Repose Clock and Its Exceptions
- Who Stands in the Chain
- Recall Non-Compliance and Shared Fault
- Punitive Damages in a Product Case
- Frequently Asked Questions
- Sources and Legal Authorities
- Disclaimer
- Related posts:
An injury from a defective airbag in Georgia is a product liability claim against the manufacturer, and for an older vehicle the decisive question can be the calendar rather than the defect. A ten-year repose period runs from the first sale of the product, it applies to strict-liability actions and, with two exceptions, to negligence actions, and failure-to-warn claims sit outside it.
The Takata Inflator Defect
A 2020 safety recall bulletin that General Motors issued for certain 2005 Saab 9-2X vehicles, published on NHTSA’s recall site, describes the defect in the terms these claims rely on. It states that the propellant wafers in some Takata non-desiccated inflators containing phase stabilized ammonium nitrate “may degrade over time, which could lead to overaggressive combustion in the event the air bag is activated,” that the resulting internal pressure “may cause the inflator body to rupture,” and that “[a]n inflator rupture may cause metal fragments to pass through the air bag and into the vehicle interior at high speed, which may result in injury or death to vehicle occupants.” The bulletin placed Georgia in its Zone A, the states and territories “with the greatest temperature cycling and absolute humidity,” and its remedy was replacement of the front passenger air bag inflator (General Motors Product Safety Recall 15048).
What a Claimant Must Show Under OCGA 51-1-11
OCGA 51-1-11(b)(1) makes the manufacturer of personal property sold as new, whether directly or through a dealer or another person, liable in tort, regardless of privity, to a person who suffers injury to person or property because, when the manufacturer sold it, the product was not merchantable and reasonably suited to its intended use, and that condition at sale proximately caused the injury. A recall notice is evidence bearing on those elements; it is not one of them.
Manufacturing, Design, and Warning Claims
The Supreme Court of Georgia recognizes “three general categories of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and marketing/packaging defects” (Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732 (1994)). For a design defect, in which “the entire product line may be called into question and there is typically no readily ascertainable external measure of defectiveness,” Banks adopted a risk-utility test, which weighs the risks in a product’s design against the product’s utility as designed. The court quoted the essential inquiry as “whether the design chosen was a reasonable one from among the feasible choices of which the manufacturer was aware or should have been aware.” A manufacturing defect is a departure of the individual unit from its intended design.
A warning claim is separate. In Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723 (1994), the court distinguished a manufacturer’s duty “to exercise reasonable care in manufacturing its products so as to make products that are reasonably safe for intended or foreseeable uses” from its duty, when its product “involves danger to users,” to warn of it, and wrote that “[i]n failure to warn cases, the duty to warn arises whenever the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising from the use of its product.” What the manufacturer knew, and when, is therefore central to a warning claim.
The Ten-Year Repose Clock and Its Exceptions
Two limits govern these claims. The general period for injury to the person is two years after the right of action accrues (OCGA 9-3-33). Separately, “[n]o action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury” (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(2)).
Subsection (c) extends the ten-year limit to negligence actions against a manufacturer, “except an action seeking to recover from a manufacturer for injuries or damages arising out of the negligence of such manufacturer in manufacturing products which cause a disease or birth defect, or arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.” It ends: “Nothing contained in this subsection shall relieve a manufacturer from the duty to warn of a danger arising from use of a product once that danger becomes known to the manufacturer.”
Batten addressed both exceptions. On the first, the court defined the standard, quoting Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750 (1992): “Wilful conduct is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury; wanton conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences … [as to be the] equivalent in spirit to actual intent.” It held that the plaintiffs’ documents about an earlier seat-belt mechanism, and an expert whose opinion rested on that earlier design, were “insufficient as a matter of law” to show willful, reckless, or wanton conduct in the 1978 vehicle. On the second, it held that the last sentence of subsection (c) “places failure-to-warn causes of action outside the ambit of the statute of repose.” Two justices dissented from that reading and would have applied an actual-knowledge standard.
For example, imagine a vehicle first sold on March 1, 2013, whose inflator ruptures on June 1, 2026. For a strict-liability action, the ten-year period would have ended March 1, 2023, before the injury. Under Batten, a failure-to-warn claim is not subject to the repose provision, and it would turn on what the manufacturer knew and when.
Who Stands in the Chain
Subsection (b)(1) reaches the manufacturer of any personal property sold as new, and a vehicle manufacturer sells the assembled vehicle new.
Recall Non-Compliance and Shared Fault
A defendant may argue that an owner who did not respond to a recall notice contributed to the injury. If a jury assigns the owner a share of fault, the damages are reduced by that percentage, and an owner 50 percent or more responsible recovers nothing (OCGA 51-12-33).
Punitive Damages in a Product Case
Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof of aggravated conduct under OCGA 51-12-5.1(b). In a case arising from product liability, the statute sets no limit on the amount, allows only one punitive award against a defendant for any act or omission, and sends 75 percent of the award, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, to the state treasury (OCGA 51-12-5.1(e)).
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Georgia in the zone the recall treated as highest risk?
In the 2020 General Motors bulletin, yes: its Zone A, described as the states and territories with the greatest temperature cycling and absolute humidity, listed Georgia along with Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and several territories (General Motors Product Safety Recall 15048).
Can a dealer sell a new car with an unrepaired recalled airbag?
The same bulletin warns that “[i]t is a violation of Federal law for a dealer to deliver a new motor vehicle or any new or used item of motor vehicle equipment (including a tire) covered by this notification under a sale or lease until the defect or noncompliance is remedied.”
Can the manufacturer’s warranty terms limit the claim?
No. A manufacturer “may not exclude or limit the operation of this subsection” (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(3)).
Is the dealer liable as a manufacturer?
Not in a strict-liability action. A “product seller,” which includes a business that sells and distributes a product, “is not a manufacturer as provided in Code Section 51-1-11 and is not liable as such” (OCGA 51-1-11.1(a), (b)).
Sources and Legal Authorities
- General Motors, Product Safety Recall 15048, Front Passenger Air Bag Inflator (February 2020), published by NHTSA
- OCGA 51-1-11(b), (c); OCGA 51-1-11.1(a), (b)
- Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994) (quoting Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992))
- OCGA 9-3-33; OCGA 51-12-33
- OCGA 51-12-5.1(b), (e)
Disclaimer
This article provides general information about airbag-defect claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether a claim exists depends on the vehicle’s first sale, the defect alleged, what the manufacturer knew, and the specific facts. A person injured by an airbag should consult a licensed Georgia attorney about the particular situation.