Laundromat and Car Wash Injury Claims in Georgia

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A customer who slips on a wet laundromat floor or is hurt in a car wash bay can recover from the operator in Georgia only by proving something about what the operator knew. The business answers under the premises statute, which requires an owner or occupier who invites the public in to use ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe (OCGA 51-3-1), and the Supreme Court of Georgia held in 1980 that a fall by itself establishes nothing (Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980)).

What the Customer Has to Prove

The reason lies in what the statute asks of an owner. “While not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, the owner/occupier is required to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner/occupier has superior knowledge” (Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997)). Liability rests on that difference in knowledge. Under Alterman, a customer hurt by a foreign substance on the floor must show that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of it, and that the customer did not know of it or could not discover it because of something the owner did or controlled. Robinson kept that two-part test and changed when the customer must produce evidence on the second part: only after the owner has shown that the customer was negligent.

Robinson also told trial courts how to treat these disputes: “the ‘routine’ issues of premises liability, i.e., the negligence of the defendant and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s lack of ordinary care for personal safety are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication.” A court decides them as a matter of law only where the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed.

Water on the Floor: Knowledge and Inspection

Alterman describes two ways to prove the owner’s constructive knowledge. One rests on an employee who was nearby and in a position to see the hazard. The other rests on time: the substance had been there long enough that ordinary diligence, through a reasonable inspection, would have found it. Where a laundromat or car wash has no one on site, the first route has no employee to rest on, and the dispute moves to the second, to what checks the operator made and when.

The timing of the last check can decide the case. In Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A24A1720 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2025), a shopper slipped in water near the end of an aisle, water the shopper speculated may have come from a freezer there, and two employees had inspected the area within three and a half minutes before the fall. The Court of Appeals held that an inspection made that shortly before a fall was adequate as a matter of law, that the store’s general knowledge of leaks was not actual knowledge of this water, and that there was no evidence that the two employees stocking bread about 15 feet away were in a position to see the water easily.

Doors, Mats, and Machines

A fixture that stays put is judged by what the customer already knew about it. In Meadows v. Dollar General Store, 371 Ga. App. 695 (2024), a customer’s hand was caught while the customer pulled a defective sliding door closed. The customer had come through the same door without trouble earlier that day, the door carried a sign asking customers to pull it shut, and the customer knew an employee had hurt a hand on it before. The Court of Appeals treated the door as a static condition the customer knew as well as the store, and affirmed summary judgment for the store.

A hazard that moves is different. In Johnson v. LT Energy, LLC, No. A23A0240 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2023), a rubber mat at a store entrance was not fixed to the floor and could slide, sometimes leaving a gap at the threshold. The Court of Appeals held that the mat was not a static condition and that the rule about a customer’s earlier safe passage did not apply. It found evidence that the store knew the mat was unsecured and that an employee at the register could see where it lay, and it left to a jury whether the customer used ordinary care.

A defective washer, dryer, or wash-bay machine can also bring in its maker. Georgia makes the manufacturer of personal property sold as new liable in tort, without privity, to a person injured because the property was not merchantable and reasonably suited to its intended use when the manufacturer sold it, where that condition caused the injury (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(1)).

Frequently Asked Questions

Does it hurt the claim that the customer was not watching the floor?
Not by itself. Robinson held that a customer’s admission of not looking where the foot landed does not establish a lack of ordinary care as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals applied that holding in Johnson, where the customer was looking back at a companion while walking in.

Does the age of a machine limit a claim against its manufacturer?
It can. A claim under OCGA 51-1-11(b) cannot be brought more than ten years after the first sale of the product for use or consumption (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(2)). The same ten-year limit applies to a negligence claim against the manufacturer, except for claims involving a disease or birth defect or conduct showing a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property, and it does not relieve a manufacturer of the duty to warn of a danger once the danger becomes known (OCGA 51-1-11(c)).

Who answers when another company leases or services the machines?
A business that leases, installs, repairs, or maintains a product can be a “product seller” (OCGA 51-1-11.1(a)), and in a strict-liability action a product seller is not liable as a manufacturer under OCGA 51-1-11 (OCGA 51-1-11.1(b)). The section does not itself create a cause of action or affect a right to indemnity or contribution (OCGA 51-1-11.1(c)).

Is the operator liable for a robbery in the lot at night?
For causes of action arising on or after April 21, 2025, the negligent security article is the only remedy for negligent security against owners or occupiers, with stated exceptions (OCGA 51-3-53(a); SB 68 (2025), Sections 6 and 9(b)). The injured invitee must prove, among other elements, that the third person’s wrongful conduct was reasonably foreseeable because of a particularized warning or because of substantially similar prior wrongful conduct, known to the owner, on the premises or within 500 yards of them, and that the conduct came from exploiting a specific physical condition of the premises, known to the owner, that created a risk substantially greater than the general risk in the vicinity (OCGA 51-3-51). Earlier causes of action remain under prior law (SB 68, Section 9(b)), under which the Supreme Court of Georgia has judged foreseeability from the totality of the circumstances (Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023)).

  • OCGA 51-3-1; Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (1980); Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (1997)
  • Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, No. A24A1720 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2025)
  • Meadows v. Dollar General Store, 371 Ga. App. 695 (2024); Johnson v. LT Energy, LLC, No. A23A0240 (Ga. Ct. App. June 27, 2023)
  • OCGA 51-1-11(b), (c); OCGA 51-1-11.1(a), (b), (c)
  • OCGA 51-3-51; OCGA 51-3-53(a); SB 68 (2025), Sections 6 and 9(b); Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718 (2023)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about laundromat and car wash injury claims under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether an operator is liable depends on what it knew, what the customer knew, and the specific facts. A person injured at such a business should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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