Defective Car Seat Claims in Georgia: Child Restraint Failures and Product Liability

On this page

When a child seat does not hold a child in a crash, a Georgia claim against its maker starts from the federal standard the seat had to meet and Georgia’s product liability statute. It also runs up against a ten-year limit measured from the product’s first sale, and, where a federal standard left the manufacturer a choice, against federal preemption.

The Federal Standard for Child Seats

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213 “specifies requirements for child restraint systems used in motor vehicles and aircraft,” and its stated purpose “is to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft” (49 CFR 571.213, S1, S2). It applies to child restraint systems “manufactured before December 5, 2026,” and “FMVSS No. 213b applies to child restraint systems manufactured on or after December 5, 2026” (S3).

The standard tests seats dynamically. In one test configuration the sled is run “at a velocity change of 48 km/h” (S6.1.1). A forward-facing seat must “retain the test dummy’s torso within the system,” with limits on how far the dummy’s head may travel forward, and a rear-facing seat must retain “all portions of the test dummy’s torso” (S5.1.3.1, S5.1.3.2). Each seat, other than a factory-installed built-in restraint, must carry an attached registration form: a postage-paid postcard, addressed to the manufacturer, that gives the model name or number and the date of manufacture and has space for the purchaser’s name and mailing address (S5.8.1).

Georgia’s Child Restraint Law

Georgia requires a driver who transports a child under eight years of age in a passenger automobile, van, or pickup truck to restrain the child “in a child passenger restraining system appropriate for such child’s height and weight and approved by the United States Department of Transportation under provisions of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 213,” subject to listed exceptions, and in a rear seat where one is available (OCGA 40-8-76(b)(1), (b)(1)(B)). A driver is not complying “unless any child passenger restraining system required by this paragraph is installed and being used in accordance with the manufacturer’s directions for such system” (OCGA 40-8-76(b)(1)(C)).

The statute limits what a violation proves: “Violation of this Code section shall not constitute negligence per se nor contributory negligence per se” (OCGA 40-8-76(c)).

The Product Statute and a Design Defect

A seat’s manufacturer is liable in tort to a child or other person who uses the seat, or is reasonably affected by it, when the seat it sold as new was not merchantable and reasonably suited to its intended use and that condition at sale proximately caused the injury (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(1)). For a claim that a design was defective, the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted in Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732 (1994), a risk-utility test that balances the dangers of the chosen design against the product’s usefulness as designed.

When a Federal Standard Offered a Choice

Where a federal safety standard let the manufacturer choose among restraint designs, a state claim attacking that choice can be preempted, while a claim that the chosen design was itself defective can go forward. In Parks v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112 (2008), Cedric Parks, Jr., age five, died in a head-on collision while riding in the center rear seat of a 1989 Hyundai Excel, wearing the seat belt. The version of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that applied to that model let the manufacturer choose between a lap-only belt and a lap and shoulder belt for the center rear seat, and the manufacturer chose the lap-only belt. The Court of Appeals held that the federal standard “impliedly preempted” the family’s claims to the extent they asserted that the car was defective under state law because it had a lap-only belt “instead of a lap/shoulder seat belt or some other type of passenger seat restraint.” To the family’s argument under Banks, the court answered that “the analysis adopted in Banks is not an exception to the Supremacy Clause.” It also held that the federal standard did not preempt the claim that the specific design of the lap-only belt system the manufacturer installed was defective. Parks concerned a vehicle belt under Standard 208, not a child seat under Standard 213.

The Ten-Year Limit and Its Exceptions

No strict-liability action may be brought for an injury more than ten years after the first sale for use or consumption of the product that caused it (OCGA 51-1-11(b)(2)). In Parks, the first retail owner bought the car new on January 14, 1989, the family filed suit on December 30, 1999, and the court held the ten-year period had expired.

Subsection (c) applies the same limit to negligence claims, except where the manufacturer negligently made a product that causes a disease or birth defect or acted with a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property, and it leaves in place the manufacturer’s duty to warn of a danger arising from a product’s use once the manufacturer knows of it (OCGA 51-1-11(c)). The family in Parks pointed to other complaints and accidents involving similar cars to invoke the exception for willful, reckless, or wanton conduct. The court applied the rule, quoted from Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454 (2001), that in products liability cases “the ‘rule of substantial similarity’ prohibits the admission into evidence of other transactions, occurrences, or claims unless the proponent first shows that there is a ‘substantial similarity’ between the other transactions, occurrences, or claims and the claim at issue in the litigation.” Because the family did not make that showing, the exception did not apply.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does an installation mistake by a parent end the claim?
The child restraint statute itself does not make it decisive. Installing a seat other than according to the manufacturer’s directions is a violation of OCGA 40-8-76, and the statute says a violation is neither negligence per se nor contributory negligence per se (OCGA 40-8-76(b)(1)(C), (c)).

Does an expert affidavit have to accompany a product claim over a car seat?
The professions listed in OCGA 9-11-9.1(g) do not include manufacturers; the affidavit requirement applies to actions alleging professional malpractice against listed professionals (OCGA 9-11-9.1(a), (g)).

What filing period applies to a claim for a child’s injuries?
The general period for injuries to the person is two years after the right of action accrues (OCGA 9-3-33), and a child who is under 18 when the claim accrues has the same time after turning 18, except as OCGA 9-3-33.1 provides (OCGA 9-3-90(b)).

  • 49 CFR 571.213 (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 213), S1, S2, S3, S5.1.3, S5.8.1, S6.1.1
  • OCGA 40-8-76(b)(1), (c)
  • OCGA 51-1-11(b)(1), (2), (c); Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732 (1994)
  • Parks v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 112 (2008); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 273 Ga. 454 (2001) (as quoted in Parks)
  • OCGA 9-11-9.1(a), (g); OCGA 9-3-33; OCGA 9-3-90(b); OCGA 9-3-33.1

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about product liability claims involving child restraints under Georgia law. It is not legal or medical advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether a claim can be brought and when depends on the product, its sale, and the specific facts. A family whose child was hurt in a crash should seek medical care and consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *