Weather-Related Accidents: Liability When Roads Are Dangerous

On this page

After a crash in rain or fog, the other driver may blame the weather. Georgia’s traffic code names weather in its rules on speed, following distance, and headlights, and Georgia law defines an “act of God” as excluding “all idea of human agency.” Those rules frame a crash in rain, fog, or on a wet road, where the question is whether the weather excuses the driver or only changes what careful driving required. The Court of Appeals has treated a skid on a wet road as a defense that a jury, not a judge, weighs.

What the Traffic Code Requires in Bad Weather

Speed must fit the conditions. “No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing,” and every driver must drive at a reasonable and prudent speed “when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions” (OCGA 40-6-180).

Following distance must fit the road: no closer than is reasonable and prudent, given the vehicles’ speed, the traffic, and the condition of the highway (OCGA 40-6-49(a)).

Headlights must be on in rain and low visibility. Every vehicle on a highway must display lights, including headlights, from a half-hour after sunset to a half-hour before sunrise, “at any time when it is raining in the driving zone,” and “at any other time when there is not sufficient visibility to render clearly discernible persons and vehicles on the highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead” (OCGA 40-8-20).

Is the Weather an Act of God?

Georgia’s Code defines an “act of God” as “an accident produced by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea, earthquakes, inundations, sudden death, or illness,” and adds: “This expression excludes all idea of human agency” (OCGA 1-3-3(3)). Storms appear in the definition; the definition turns on whether the accident was produced by physical causes alone, without any part played by human agency.

A Skid on a Wet Road

A driver who admits violating a traffic statute must then show that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care, and an unavoidable skid on a slippery road can be that showing. Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (1985), arose from a collision at a stop sign after it had been raining and the street was wet and slippery. The defendant admitted failing to stop and that the failure caused the collision, but said the car was traveling at a reasonable speed and skidded on the wet pavement. The Court of Appeals explained the effect of the admitted violation: it established negligence per se, a prima facie showing of negligence, and shifted to the defendant the burden of showing that the violation was unintentional and in the exercise of ordinary care. The defendant’s account, that the collision “resulted from an unavoidable accident because the brakes failed to stop his vehicle on the slippery road surface,” could take the defendant’s conduct “out of the realm of negligence,” and the court stated: “The law recognizes such a defense.”

The court reversed a partial summary judgment on liability for the plaintiff, relying on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s rule in Buckhead Glass Co. v. Taylor, 226 Ga. 247 (1970), that even where negligence per se is shown, whether it proximately caused the injury is ordinarily for the jury.

Roads, Property, and Other Drivers

A property owner who invites others onto the premises answers for injuries caused by a failure to use ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe (OCGA 51-3-1). A city escapes liability for defects in its own streets when it was not negligent in building or maintaining them, had no actual notice of the defect, or the defect had not existed long enough for notice to be inferred (OCGA 32-4-93(a)).

When low visibility or a slick road involves several vehicles, the trier of fact weighs the fault of everyone who contributed to the injury, and each defendant pays only its own apportioned share, with no joint liability (OCGA 51-12-33(b), (c)).

Frequently Asked Questions

Does a guilty plea to a traffic ticket decide the injury claim?
Not by itself. In Williams v. Calhoun, the defendant had pleaded guilty to failing to yield, and the Court of Appeals treated the plea as one circumstance for the jury to weigh with the rest of the evidence.

What if the injured driver was also going too fast for the rain?
If the injured person shares responsibility for the injury, the damages are reduced in proportion to that person’s percentage of fault, and a plaintiff who is 50 percent or more responsible recovers nothing (OCGA 51-12-33(a), (g)).

Does the headlight rule apply to a vehicle parked on the roadside in fog?
OCGA 40-8-20 applies to every vehicle upon a highway “subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles as stated in this part.”

  • OCGA 40-6-180; OCGA 40-6-49(a); OCGA 40-8-20
  • OCGA 1-3-3(3)
  • Williams v. Calhoun, 175 Ga. App. 332 (1985) (quoting Buckhead Glass Co. v. Taylor, 226 Ga. 247 (1970))
  • OCGA 51-3-1; OCGA 32-4-93(a)
  • OCGA 51-12-33(a), (b), (c), (g)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about weather-related collisions under Georgia law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Whether weather excuses a driver’s conduct depends on the facts of each collision. Anyone injured in a weather-related collision should consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

Leave a comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *