Parent Liability for Minor Children’s Torts in Georgia

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Being a child’s parent does not, by itself, make a parent answerable in a Georgia injury claim. Liability reaches a parent through a route the law recognizes: a statute that caps a parent’s liability for a child’s willful or malicious acts, the agency reasoning behind the family-purpose doctrine, or the parent’s own negligence in entrusting a vehicle.

The Relationship Alone Is Not Enough

In Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275 (1915), the Supreme Court of Georgia wrote: “It may be taken as settled law in this State that a father is not liable for the tort of a minor child, with which he was in no way connected, which he did not ratify, and from which he did not derive any benefit, merely because of the relation of parent and child,” citing Chastain v. Johns, 120 Ga. 977.

The general principle is in OCGA 51-2-2, which makes a person liable for torts committed by a child or servant at the person’s command or in the prosecution and within the scope of the person’s business, whether by negligence or voluntarily. In Grant v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 690 (1983), a case about an employee who drove a tractor after hours, the Court of Appeals wrote that “[o]wnership of a vehicle alone is not sufficient to establish an owner’s liability.”

The Family-Purpose Route

Griffin began with a petition alleging that a mother owned an automobile, kept it for the comfort and pleasure of the family, including a minor son, and that the son was driving it with the mother’s consent when the car negligently struck the plaintiff’s buggy. The trial court sustained a demurrer and struck the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, “[a]dmitting these allegations to be true, as the demurrer does, they state a case of liability on the part of the mother.” Its reasoning: “If she kept the automobile to be used for the comfort and pleasure of her family, including her minor son as a member thereof, such use was her business or affair within the meaning of the rule of law discussed above.” And: “If a father or mother, owning an automobile, and keeping it to be used for the comfort and pleasure of the family, should authorize a son to drive it for the comfort or pleasure of the family, this would make the owner liable for the negligence of the son operating the machine for such purpose.”

The decision drew a line. It distinguished cases “in which a chauffeur or a child of the owner of an automobile took it without the knowledge or consent of the owner, or against his instructions, and used it for his own purpose, entirely disconnected from the business of the owner or the purpose for which the machine was intended by him to be used.” Presiding Justice Evans concurred specially and disagreed with the proposition that a parent is liable on the doctrine of respondeat superior when a family member drives the car filled with the driver’s own associates, in a use unconnected with the purpose for which the car was provided.

The Code names the doctrine without defining it. OCGA 51-2-3(b) provides that the capped statute “shall be cumulative and shall not be restrictive of any remedies now available to any person, firm, or corporation for injuries or damages arising out of the acts, torts, or negligence of a minor child under the ‘family-purpose car doctrine,’ any statute, or common law in force and effect in this state.”

The Capped Statute

OCGA 51-2-3(a) provides that “[e]very parent or guardian having the custody and control over a minor child or children under the age of 18 shall be liable in an amount not to exceed $10,000.00 plus court costs for the willful or malicious acts of the minor child or children resulting in reasonable medical expenses to another, damage to the property of another, or both reasonable medical expenses and damage to property.”

For example, imagine a 15-year-old’s willful act that causes $7,500 in reasonable medical expenses and $6,500 in property damage, a total of $14,000. Under subsection (a), the parent’s liability is limited to $10,000 plus court costs, so $4,000 of the loss falls outside the statute, and any recovery of that $4,000 from the parent would have to come through another route that subsection (b) preserves.

The Parent’s Own Negligence

A parent who owns a vehicle may also be liable for the parent’s own conduct. In Grant v. Jones, the plaintiff argued that the owner had negligently entrusted a tractor to a worker whom the owner knew to have a propensity toward habitual intoxication. The Court of Appeals rejected the claim on two grounds: there was “no evidence that William Pope had any knowledge of Jones’ driving under the influence of alcohol or that he was not competent to drive,” and “there was no entrustment of the tractor to Jones at the time of the accident, as he had taken the vehicle without permission, and it was being operated without William Pope’s knowledge and consent.”

In Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 (2015), the Supreme Court of Georgia described the tort, quoting CGL Facility Management v. Wiley, 328 Ga. App. 727 (2014): liability for negligent entrustment rests on “a negligent act of the owner in lending [an instrumentality] to another to [use], with actual knowledge that the [other] is incompetent or habitually reckless, and this negligence must concur, as a part of the proximate cause, with the negligent conduct of the [other] on account of his incompetency and recklessness.” The Court wrote that proof of the elements, “including actual knowledge of the incompetence or recklessness of the person to whom the instrumentality in question is entrusted,” proves that the entrusted person’s negligence was foreseeable to the one who entrusted. Both decisions state the rule outside the parent-and-child setting: Grant involved an employer’s tractor, and Zaldivar a work truck an employer provided to an employee.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can a child be treated as a parent’s agent?
Yes. Griffin stated that a child “may occupy the position of a servant or agent of his parent, and for his acts as such the parent may be liable under the general principles governing the relation of master and servant, or principal and agent.”

Does the $10,000 statute cover pain and suffering?
Its words reach willful or malicious acts “resulting in reasonable medical expenses to another, damage to the property of another, or both” (OCGA 51-2-3(a)). Other losses must come through the routes subsection (b) preserves.

Does the statute reach a guardian or only a parent?
It applies to “[e]very parent or guardian having the custody and control over a minor child or children under the age of 18” (OCGA 51-2-3(a)).

What was the statute meant to do?
The General Assembly stated its intent “to provide for the public welfare and aid in the control of juvenile delinquency, not to provide restorative compensation to victims of injurious or tortious conduct by children” (OCGA 51-2-3(c)).

  • OCGA 51-2-2; OCGA 51-2-3
  • Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275 (1915); Chastain v. Johns, 120 Ga. 977 (as cited in Griffin)
  • Grant v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 690 (1983)
  • Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 (2015); CGL Facility Management v. Wiley, 328 Ga. App. 727 (2014) (as quoted in Zaldivar)

Disclaimer

This article provides general information about a parent’s liability for a child’s acts under Georgia law. It is not legal advice, is not medical advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Which route applies depends on who owned the vehicle, who permitted its use, the child’s age and conduct, and the specific facts. A person injured by a minor should seek medical care and consult a licensed Georgia attorney promptly about the particular situation.

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